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In this paper, we address the causes of the Roaring Twenties in the
United States. In particular, we use a version of the real business cycle
model to test the hypothesis that an extraordinary pace of produc-
tivity growth was the driving factor. Our motivation comes from the
abundance of evidence of signi￿cant technological progress during this
period, fed by innovations in manufacturing and the widespread intro-
duction of electricity. Our estimated total factor productivity series
generate arti￿cial model output that shows high conformity with the
data: the model economy sucessfully replicates the boom years from
1922-1929.
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11 Introduction
￿ [The 1920s] represent nearly seven years of unparalleled plenty
[...] during which the businessman was, as Stuart Chase put it,
￿ the dictator of our destinies,￿ousting ￿ the statesman, the priest,
the philosopher, as the creator of standards of ethics and behav-
ior￿and becoming ￿ the ￿nal authority on the conduct of Ameri-
can society.￿For nearly seven years, the prosperity band-wagon
rolled down Main Street.￿[Allen, 1931, 133]
After surviving the woebegone 1920-21 recession, the United States￿an-
nualized per capita output grew at a staggering pace of over 3.3 percent for
the rest of the decade ￿about 1.5 percentage points higher than the 20th
century average. In fact, the Twenties show the highest annualized output
growth of any of Field￿ s (2006, see also Table 1) growth cycles. What caused
this unique episode in U.S. economic history? In this paper, we address this
issue in the context of a neoclassical model of the business cycle. In par-
ticular, we use a version of the real business cycle (RBC) model to test
the hypothesis that an extraordinary pace of productivity growth was the
driving factor.1 We also provide historical evidence of such growth.
This paper is not the ￿rst to apply neoclassical modeling techniques to
the prewar era. Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004) and Bordo, Erceg and Evans
(2000), among others, evaluate the ability of RBC or sticky price money
models to explain the Great Depression. In addition, Harrison and Weder
(2006) assess the possibility that a model in which self-ful￿lling beliefs (aka
sunspots) drive business cycles might explain it. They provide evidence
that extrinsic pessimism starting in 1930 turned what might have been a
recession into the Great Depression.
Our goal here is to follow the lead taken by the above authors by extend-
ing the analysis to the experience of the US economy during the Roaring
Twenties.2 We believe that the RBC approach is an appropriate framework
to attack this issue, not only because of its elegant simplicity and success
in explaining postwar cycles, but also in light of considerable evidence of
much technological progress during the Roaring Twenties. In fact, the cur-
rent paper is the ￿rst that numerically evaluates the general equilibrium
1We de￿ne real business cycles in the sense of "[...] recurrent ￿ uctuations in an econ-
omy￿ s incomes, products, and factor inputs ￿especially labor ￿that are due to nonmone-
tary sources." [McGrattan, 2006, 1]. However, here we stress solely technological progress.
2We acknowledge that other factors might have contributed to the Roaring Twenties.
(See for example Harrison and Weder, 2008.) However, the goal here is to examine the
e⁄ects of technological changes in isolation.
2e⁄ects of how and by how much identi￿ed productivity gains during the
1920s translated into the unwonted boom in U.S. economic activity.
As will be seen in more detail in the next Section, total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) growth during the 1920s was persistently above trend (shown in
Figure 1). In addition, beginning right after the recession of 1920-21, out-
put remained above trend for the entire decade. As does Field (2006), we
attribute these TFP improvements to innovations that originated in manu-
facturing, which were chie￿ y made possible by switching production to the
use of electricity:
"[e]xtraordinary across-the-board gains from exploiting small
electric motors, and recon￿guring factories from the multistory
pattern that mechanical distribution of steam power required to
the one story layout that was now possible. [Field, 2006, p 216]
In other words, innovations like the automobile industry￿ s assembly line,
the adoption of electric power and the use of the frictional horsepower elec-
tric motor led to increases in production possibilities in many sectors of the
economy. We present detailed evidence in the next Section.
To evaluate the widespread e⁄ects that innovations in manufacturing
and the switch to electricity had on the aggregate economy, we feed model-
consistent estimates of TFP into a calibrated general equilibrium model. We
use the canonical version of the RBC model, with the one added feature that
utilization of the capital stock can vary over the cycle. We examine versions
of the model, however, both with and without this feature. Without it, TFP
is the standard Solow residual; while with this feature, our estimate of TFP
takes into account a model-consistent measure of utilization.
Our data cover the period 1892-1941. In our analysis we examine the
success of each model over the entire period, though our focus is on the
1920s. In particular, we examine each model￿ s ability to replicate both the
expansive nature of the decade in general, and the three recessions that oc-
curred: one large, from 1920:I to 1921:III; and two milder, from 1923:II to
1924:III, and 1926:III to 1927:IV. The models get the timing of the ￿rst two
recessions wrong, as in each case the negative technology shocks come too
late. On the other hand, a fall in productive capacity does accompany the
last recession. In addition, our results indicate that increases in the level
of technology during the 1920s are essential for understanding its roaring
nature, i.e. the above trend growth. The correlations over this period be-
tween model and data for the two models are 0.84 and 0.58 respectively.

















Figure 1: US total factor productivity, cycle denotes the percentage devia-
tions from 1892-1941 trend. Data source: Kendrick (1961,Table A-XXIII).
40.73. Our conclusion is that the standard RBC model replicates the data
extremely well, while adjusting for variable utilization of capital weakens
the power of the model.3
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline the
technological experiences of the Roaring Twenties, providing supporting ev-
idence, in historical perspective. Section 3 describes the model; and in
Section 4 we present our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Roaring Twenties
￿ Pick up one of those graphs with which statisticians measure
the economic ups and downs of the Post-war Decade. You will
￿nd that the line of business activity rises to a jagged peak in
1920, drops precipitously into a deep valley in late 1920 and
1921, climbs uncertainly upward through 1922 to another peak
at the middle of 1923, dips somewhat in 1924 (but not nearly so
far as in 1921), rises again in 1925 and zigzags up to a perfect
Everest of prosperity in 1929-only to plunge down at last into
the bottomless abyss of 1930 and 1931. Hold the graph at arm￿ s-
length and glance at it again, and you will see that the clefts
of 1924 and 1927 are mere indentations in a lofty and irregular
plateau which reaches from early 1923 to late 1929.￿[Allen, 1931,
132f]
In this Section we provide economic background on the Roaring Twen-
ties, from the perspective of technological change. We begin with data on
output and on TFP, and conclude with evidence of speci￿c innovations that
were key factors in determining the growth experience of the 1920s.
2.1 Output
Figure 2 portrays US GNP (private domestic nonfarm) per capita over the
period 1892-1941. GNP data is from Kendrick (1961, Commerce Concept).
The population series (16 and over) is from the Historical Statistics of the
US (Colonial Times to 1970). Also plotted is the implied pre-war (what
Allen calls Post-war) trend.
3Temin (2008) questions the ability of the frictionless RBC model to explain the Great
Depression. Here we do not claim that our theory can explain all ￿ uctuations. For
example, our model does not capture the 1920-21 recession precisely because it appears
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Figure 2: Prewar per capita output











The average annual growth rate over the period is 1.52 percent.4 This is
about 0.4 percentage points lower than the 20th century￿ s compounded rate
of growth. Notable for us is the persistent deviation from trend starting in
1919. Figure 2 also shows that, starting in 1923, the economy stays above
and parallel to trend, until 1929. The peak was in 1926. However, it is
4We are aware of potential problems with Kendrick￿ s data at business cycle frequencies
predating 1908 (see Romer, 1989, however, Weir, 1986, for criticism of her method). Here
we look at longer run movements, hence, these issues are of minor importance.
6virtually indistinguishable from the 1929 value. Furthermore, the amplitude
of the ￿ uctuations declines dramatically after 1923. This is all true despite
the two recessions that occurred from 1923:II to 1924:III and 1926:III to
1927:IV.
Table 1 provides more evidence of the remarkable growth in output dur-
ing the 1920s. It contains, in the ￿rst column, data on per capita output
growth over the period of our sample. The selection of periods follows Field
(2003, 2006, 2008), whose aim is to measure peak-to-peak performances of
growth cycles. (1892 is the ￿rst peak year for which Kendrick￿ s data are
available at an annual frequency.) The 1919-1929 output growth ￿gure is
above average. However, it does not stand out. Real vigor becomes visible
by excluding the recession from 1920:I-1921:III, in the 1921-1929 row. Here
compounded annual growth tops 3.5 percent. The 1920-21 recession was
quite deep, with per capita output falling about 5 percent, so many authors
(including Olney, 1991) de￿ne the Roaring Twenties as starting after it. In
fact, some of the highest growth occurs right after it, or as Allen notes:
"The hopeless depression of 1921 had given way to the hope-
ful improvement of 1922 and the rushing revival of 1923.￿[Allen,
1931, 132]
2.2 Technology
Also included in Table 1 is TFP growth rates using Kendrick￿ s (1961) mea-
sure of TFP: the ratio of GNP to an index of total factor input. This input
measure is a factor share￿ weighted average of aggregate capital input and
labor input. TFP growth picks up starting in 1919. While the same peak-to-
peak interpretation does not apply here, the growth of TFP from 1921-1929
is virtually identical to that of the period Field (2003) coined the "most
technologically progressive decade," the 1930s. In addition, as seen in Fig-
ure 1, just like output, the cyclical component of TFP remains above-trend
from 1923-1929. Over no other period in our sample does such a prolonged
positive deviation from trend occur.5
For consistency with our theoretical model, Figure 3 displays TFP using
a calibrated Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of 67
5Noteworthy also is the deviation below trend during the war years, in particular the
drop in 1914. There are a number of plausible factors behind this: amongst these stands
the enactment of the Federal personal income tax in 1913. As per the introduction of an
income tax, initially the rates were low with the the highest bracket at 7 percent. During
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Figure 3: Naive TFP (Solow residual from Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion)
percent. (Details are in the next Section.) Capital input and labor input are
taken from Kendrick (1961, private domestic nonfarm). Again, TFP growth
is above trend and signi￿cantly less volatile starting in 1923. Of signi￿cance
for our later calibration, this TFP, detrended, as shown in Figure 4, is well-
described by an AR(1) process with persistence parameter 0.55. Figure 4
also displays the residuals from this process. Though relatively small, these
innovations are mostly positive during the 1920s. In fact, they are positive
for every year from 1923-1929.
2.3 Technological change during the 1920s
"Within business cycle research, some open questions remain.
What is the source of large cyclical movements in TFP? [...]
Are movements in TFP primarily due to new inventions and
processes that are, by the nature of research and development,
stochastically discovered? Or are movements in TFP primarily
due to changing government regulations that may alter the e¢ -
ciency of production? Are they due to unmeasured investments











95 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Residual Detrended TFP
Figure 4: The dynamic process of TFP
There is much evidence to support the measured surge in TFP during
the 1920s, in the form of technological change. In particular, we argue that
the economy-wide innovations were driven by two factors: (1) improvements
made in manufacturing, and (2) the widespread adoptions of electricity, and
the frictional horsepower electric motor in particular.
Support for both of these comes from the contemporary Report of the
Committee on Recent Economic Changes of the President￿ s Conference on
Unemployment (1929):
"The increased supply of power and its wider uses; the mul-
tiplication by man of his strength and skill through machinery,
the expert division and arrangement of work in mines and fac-
tories, on the farms, and in the trades, so that production per
man hour of e⁄ort has risen to new heights." [1929, p ix-x]
The e⁄ects of these changes were exactly what one would expect from
positive technology shocks:
"[...] both energy savings and increased productivity in man-
ufacturing contributed to the dramatic change in the energy-
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Figure 5: Trends in US energy consumption, original source of energy data:
Schurr and Netschert (1960)
The importance of technological change in manufacturing is central to
Field (2006), who reports that the surge in TFP ￿rst and foremost origi-
nated in that sector. Over the 1919-1929 span, manufacturing TFP￿ s annual
growth rate was 5.12 percent: more than double the 2.02 percent average for
the aggregate economy.
Likewise, Oshima (1984) attributes much of the growth in the economy
to that in manufacturing:
"Mechanization raised output per worker at a faster rate than
could be accomplished with the steam-driven technology of the
nineteenth century [...]. The new machines ￿faster, more pow-
erful [...] raised per capita output." [Oshima, 1984, p 161].
Perhaps the most-cited innovation in manufacturing during this period
is Ford￿ s adoption of the assembly line, realized between 1908 and 1913.
Motor vehicle production rose tenfold from 1913 to 1928; and by the end of
the 1920s, sixty percent of American families owned an automobile (Smiley,
2008).
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US electric power production (billions of kilowatt hours)
Figure 6: Electricity production. Source: NBER Historical Macro database.
assembly line, followed in many other industries, including communication,
transportation, and consumer appliances:
"[Executives￿ ] con￿dence was strengthened by their almost
invincible ally. And they were all of them aided by the boom
in the automobile industry. The phenomenal activity of this
one part of the body economic-which was responsible, directly
or indirectly, for the employment of nearly four million men￿
pumped new life into all the rest.￿[Allen, 1931, 139]
The other important source of growth during the 1920s was the expand-
ing use of electricity in production ￿the
"[...] lever to increase production." [Devine, 1983, 363]
Kyvig notes:
"Electric current, generated and controlled for human use,
was not a new phenomenon by the 1920s, but, as with the auto-
mobile, in that decade it ￿rst came to be used by a multitude of
people." [Kyvig, 2002, 43].
11In 1919, 55% of manufacturing￿ s power was supplied by electricity. By
1929, this number had increased to 82% (Atack and Passell, 1994). Figures
5 and 6 illustrate. Figure 5 shows the marked increase in the productivity
of energy (i.e. the energy-GNP ratio as mentioned by Devine, 1983) in
the United States starting in 1917. Its general pattern is very similar to
the (detrended) aggregate TFP series. Figure 6 plots the upward surge of
electricity production ￿electric power production almost tripled from 1919
to 1929.
The innovations in manufacturing and the adoption of electricity resulted
in a plethora of further inventions that were widespread and spurred on
growth. These included radios, which helped to revolutionize the advertising
business. After the ￿rst radio broadcast by KDKA Pittsburgh in November
1920, sales of radio sets, parts and accessories surged from $60 million in
1922 to over $842 million by 1929. Among the long list of other product
inventions is irons, toasters, television and vacuum cleaners. Retail also
exploded, with Sears opening stores in 1924 ￿previously, they were strictly
mail order. Montgomery Ward and Woolworth, along with several grocery
stores, followed (Smiley, 2008).
As an aside, Allen (1931) discusses the adoption of a more sophisticated
organization of production, which likely also contributed to the observed
dampening of the cycle:
"Executives, remembering with a shudder the piled-up inven-
tories of 1921, had learned the lesson of cautious hand-to-mouth
buying; and they were surrounded with more expert techni-
cal consultants, research men, personnel managers, statisticians,
and business forecasters than ever before invaded that cave of
the winds, the conference room.￿[Allen, 1931, 139]
Despite the overall expansionary nature of the decade, there were 3 re-
cessions. While the ￿rst was certainly a post-WWI decline, it is also often
blamed on inept monetary policy. The third may have been related to Ford￿ s
closing of his factories to switch from Model T to Model A:
"The 1927 recession was also associated with Henry Ford￿ s
shut-down of all his factories for six months in order to changeover
from the Model T to the new Model A automobile. Though the
Model T￿ s market share was declining after 1924, in 1926 Ford￿ s
Model T still made up nearly 40 percent of all the new cars
produced and sold in the United States." [Smiley, 2008]
12Below we examine our theory￿ s ability to replicate the cycles that oc-
curred during the Roaring Twenties, as well as the economically expansive
nature of the decade in general.
3 The arti￿cial economy
The arti￿cial economy is a one-sector dynamic general equilibrium model
with variable capital utilization. We assume that the economy is populated
by identical consumer-worker households of measure one, each of which lives
forever. There are Nt family members in every household in period t. The






￿t [(1 ￿ ￿)lnct + ￿ln(1 ￿ ht)]Nt
subject to






and k0 is given. We restrict the parameters 0 < ￿ < 1, 0 < ￿ < 1, and
0 < ￿ < 1. The variables ct, ht, kt, and ut denote consumption, labor,
capital (all in per capita terms) and the capital utilization rate. As in most
studies with variable capital utilization, the rate of depreciation, ￿t, is an
increasing function of the utilization rate, hence ￿ > 1. This formulation fol-
lows Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988). The constant population
growth rate is given by n. Labor-augmenting technology, At, grows at the
constant rate a. We denote productivity shocks by zt, and assume that they
follow the standard AR(1) process. All markets are perfectly competitive.






















+ 1 ￿ ￿t+1
￿
(1 + a)(1 + n)kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿t)kt + yt ￿ ct
yt = ct + xt = zt(utkt)￿(Atht)1￿￿:
13We calibrate our economy to averages of the US economy over our sam-
ple period.6 The fundamental period is a year. We set ￿ = 0:33; which
corresponds to the capital share for the private domestic economy in 1929
(see also Johnson, 1954). In addition, a = 0:015 and n = 0:019. These num-
bers conform to our TFP and population measures￿average growth rates.
Lastly, we set the discount factor at ￿ = 0:96 and the steady state rate
of physical capital depreciation at ￿ = 0:055; which we take directly from
McGrattan and Ohanian (2007). Together, these values imply a capital to
output ratio of 2:5, which is the average of Maddison￿ s (1991) ￿gures for the
US gross non-residential capital stock to GDP ratio for 1890 and 1913. The
calibration produces a consumption share of 77 percent. This is close to the
average for 1892 to 1941, 75 percent (GNP, Commerce Department concept,
derivation from Kuznets￿estimates, from Kendrick, 1961). The parameter ￿
is set such that households spent one third of their time endowment working.
Lastly, ￿ is pinned down by the steady state conditions
￿ =




In this Section, we present our results. Our goal is to examine the ability of
technology shocks in the model economy to replicate the US experience of
the 1920s. First, we assume a constant capital utilization rate in production.
Here, total factor productivity is simply the naive Solow residual. Then, we
allow for the richness given to the model by allowing this rate to vary over
time.
4.1 Standard real business cycle model
We start with the plain vanilla model, in which capital utilization remains
constant.7 Our ￿rst step is to estimate TFP via the standard Solow residual.
This is accomplished by setting ut = 1 for all periods in the production





6See Cooley (1997) for an authoritative description of calibration.
7In terms of our model economy, this amounts to allowing costs of adjusting capital
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Figure 7: US and arti￿cial output, 1919-1941, 1929=100
The resulting series fztg; as well as its log-linear detrended version and
innovations, were presented in Figures 3 and 4. As mentioned in Section
2.2, the detrended TFP time series is well-described by an AR(1) process.
Recall that TFP underwent a signi￿cant surge upward starting in 1923. It
then remained above-trend until the end of the decade, at which point it
collapsed.
Next, we feed the computed series fztg into the arti￿cial economy. Our
detrending method suggests that Kendrick￿ s 1892 capital input was about
15 percent below the 1892 to 1941 trend. Therefore, we start with an ini-
tial capital stock 15 below the steady state. This assumption impacts the
beginning of the simulation, but has no e⁄ect on the results for the 1920s.8
Figure 7 compares arti￿cial output and US data, starting with 1919.
The US data are detrended by their 1892 to 1941 trend; and both series are
scaled to equal 100 in 1929. Over this period, the correlation between model
and data is 0.60. More relevant for us, the model is extremely successful
in replicating the overall experience of the 1920s: this correlation is 0.84,
8Capital moves at low frequencies; and it turns out that the initial conditions will not
have any signi￿cant impact on our results. For example, if we instead assumed that initial
capital is 15 percent above steady state then the output in 1919 would be changed by a
dwar￿sh 0.07 percent (see also the Appendix).
15and for the period from 1922-1929 there is an almost perfect ￿t (0.92). Just
like in the data, the model￿ s 1920s peak is in 1926; and the 1929 value is
indistinguishable from this peak. As for the three recessions, output rises
in the model from 1920-21. Recalling that this recession has been largely
attributed to inept monetary policy (for example, Friedman and Schwartz,
1963), this is not surprising. Model output also rises during the period of the
next, much milder, recession: from 1923-24. In both of these cases, however,
model output falls in the year following the actual recession. TFP followed
the same pattern: rising during the recession years and falling after. The
model, by attributing ￿ uctuations only to changes in technology, therefore
predicts that both recessions come too late. The recession from 1926-27,
is, however, well-captured by the model, with a simultaneous fall in TFP
that, as discussed above, re￿ ects the negative technology shock brought on
by disruptions related to Ford￿ s closing of his factories to switch from Model
T to Model A. 9
4.2 Variable utilization
"E⁄orts to measure the percentage utilization of the produc-
tive capacity of real capital stocks are to be welcomed as adding
to our information on explanatory variables. Unfortunately no
reliable long-run measures of this variable are available either
for the business economy or for most of its individual divisions."
[Kendrick, 1973, 26]
There is considerable evidence that utilization rates of capital vary sig-
ni￿cantly over the short and medium run. The subsequent issue of mis-
measurement of TFP at business cycle frequencies goes back at least to
Summers￿(1986) critique of RBC theory. Unfortunately, we do not have
data for capital utilization over our sample period. Potential solutions to
this include the use of a proxy. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (1995) employ electricity consumption and ￿nd that adjusted TFP
is much less volatile than the naive Solow residual. Data on electricity pro-
duction is in fact available for the 1920s. However, we are reluctant to use
it because of the extraordinary structural changes in manufacturing￿ s use of
electricity during the 1920s. It would be hard to distinguish between trend
and cycle.
9The reader will also notice that the model￿ s fall in output starting in 1930 is not as
deep as that in the data. This evidence, that productivity cannot explain the weakness
of output, is reminiscent of that of Cole and Ohanian (1999), who ￿nd that technology
shocks cannot explain fully the depth of and weak recovery from the Great Depression.
16Hence, we instead compute a series of model-consistent utilization rates.10
In particular, (1) determines the optimal utilization rate as a function of








Figure 8 plots the detrended series futg. We see an unusually high, persistent
and smooth rate of capital utilization during the 1920s: with 1929=100, the
index varies only from 94 to 101, and is on average quite high, especially
over the later part of the decade. This is followed by a massive drop in
utilization at the start of the Great Depression.12 The high rate in 1941
very likely re￿ ects the e⁄ects of the war in Europe on the United States.13
Next, a new series for total factor productivity is computed, accounting




The resulting (log-linearly detrended) series is well-described by a ￿rst order
autoregressive process with ￿ = 0:54.14 Utilization-adjusted TFP is plotted
vis-a-vis the naive version in Figure 9 (normalized in 1929). Since utilization
of capital did not vary much during the 1920s, we expect the two series to
be highly correlated; and their correlation coe¢ cient is in fact 0.99. As is
typical, adjusted TFP is less volatile, re￿ ecting factor hoarding.
Figure 10 displays arti￿cial output, when shocked with utilization-adjusted
TFP, and US data on per capita output between 1919 and 1941. Again, the
US data are detrended by their 1892 to 1941 trend and both series are scaled
to equal 100 in 1929. The two series are again very similar. The year to
year correlation is about the same as the plain vanilla model￿ s: 0.61 versus
0.60 for 1919-1941. Overall, the model again is able to replicate the eight
10See also Weder (2006).
11When we apply the same procedure to post-war data, the resulting series replicates
well the Federal Reserve￿ s Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization Index. See
Appendix.
12As a benchmark for accuracy, Bresnahan and Ra⁄ (1991) suggest that about twenty
percent of the aggregate capital stock lay fallow at the depth of the Depression in 1933. If
we interpret the values for 1929 being near full utilization, our constructed series matches
this ￿gure.
13For example, Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act in early 1941, which committed
U.S. weapons to the Allied forces.
14Utilization does not a⁄ect long run TFP, as it does not follow a trend. Hence, the
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Figure 9: Utilization adjusted TFP (detrended, 1929=100)
18year boom followed by a massive four year drop in 1929. However, when
evaluated numerically, for the 1920-1929 stretch the arti￿cial economy now
performs worse: the correlation falls to 0.58 from 0.84. (Starting from 1922,
however, there is a 73% correlation between model and data.) Since TFP
again falls only after each of the ￿rst two recessions, model output falls a
year too late in each case. In addition, the model now peaks too early ￿in
1924; and this peak is about 4% higher than the value in 1929. Adjusting for
utilization appears to take out some of the e⁄ects of technological progress
that the naive accounting suggested for the 1920s.15
To better understand this result, Figure 11 displays the TFP input from
each simulation. The two series correspond to the cycle component from Fig-
ure 3 and the equivalent series constructed from utilization-adjusted TFP.
While they appear to be almost identical, the movements of utilization-
adjusted TFP are usually smaller, again re￿ ecting factor hoarding. The
only exception is 1921 in which the adjusted TFP was larger. Again, other
factors played a crucial role in this recession. Moreover, as can be seen
from Figure 9, adjusted TFP is higher than the naive version during most
of the early 1920s. Together with the stronger propagation mechanism of
the endogenous-utilization economy, this produces two e⁄ects. First, there
is a larger response to TFP￿ s upswing in 1923 and 1924, resulting in output
that is too high relative to data. Second, once either model is away from its
(stable) steady state, it endogenously reverts back to it. This e⁄ect is also
stronger in the variable utilization model, so output declines relative to the
plain vanilla model, and to the US data. The second e⁄ect dominates later,
since shocks to TFP are relatively small after 1924. In summary, the pre-
dictions for the 1920s of the utilization-corrected model are less successful
than those of the standard RBC model.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the origins of the Roaring Twenties in the United
States. In particular, we applied a version of the real business cycle model
to test the hypothesis that an exceptional pace of productivity growth was
the driving factor behind eight extraordinary years of economic boom.
Our motivation comes from abundant evidence of signi￿cant technolog-
ical progress during this period. In particular, process innovations and the
15However, the model￿ s performance is about the same as the standard RBC model￿ s
for the 1930s. This supports Ohanian￿ s (2001) suggestion that accounting for utilization
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Figure 11: TFP (percentage) deviations from trend
20widespread adoption of electricity in manufacturing and in particular the
frictional horsepower electric motor led to economy-wide increases in pro-
ductivity. Therefore, we have included only technology shocks here. In fact,
this paper is the ￿rst that numerically evaluates the general equilibrium ef-
fects of the technological change on the US economy during the 1920s. Using
a plain vanilla RBC model, our estimated TFP shocks lead to arti￿cial out-
put series that are highly correlated with the data, especially over the period
1922-1929. Since these years are generally considered the de￿ning ones for
the 1920s, we take it from our analysis, that extraordinary technological
change was the main force behind the Roaring Twenties. The model also
predicts well the 1926-27 recession. However, when we allow for variable
capital utilization, the model is considerably less successful at replicating
both the general nature of the decade, and its ups and downs.
In the future we may extend this analysis in several di⁄erent directions.
More information may be gleaned from a model in which technical change
is allowed to be investment-speci￿c. In addition, Olney (1991) attributes
much of the robustness of growth during the 1920s to the expansion of the
availability of credit. A model that incorporates this feature of the economy
would shed more light on this unique episode in U.S. economic history.
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6 Appendix
This Appendix presents robustness checks of our reported results. First, we
show that our data representation is not overly dependent on the detrending
method. Let us follow Cole and Ohanian (1999) and trend-adjust by dividing
output by its 20th century long-run trend growth rate ￿1.9 percent relative
to the reference date. Figure 12 illustrates. Except for the brief 1906-07
boom, the US economy did not spend much time as aloft as in 1920s. Overall,
the higher trend does not change the punch-line of our paper. We are
reluctant to use the "1.9 percent de￿ ator" since TFP grew at a much smaller
rate during the prewar era: the 1892 to 1941 grow rate was about 1.5 percent.
Perhaps it is sensible to assume that there was a structural break after the
war, in any case, we do not elaborate on this break issue here. Hence, we
de￿ ate by the prewar rate in the paper. We also note that our cyclical
output time series is very similar to Berry￿ s (1988).
Our other robustness check involves our decision to begin our simulations
in 1892 with an initial capital stock 15% below trend. To show the small
e⁄ect of this￿resulting from the low frequency movements of the capital
stock ￿we alternatively begin the simulation in 1919 with an initial capital
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Figure 12: Detrended per capita output
re￿ ect the resulting value after detrending the series on capital. Figure 13
shows that this has a negligible e⁄ect.
Figure 14 shows that our capital utilization series is very similar to the
Federal Reserve Bank￿ s measure. The ￿t is not perfect but in the absence of
any data for the 1920s, we have used our best estimate. The correlation is
0.72 overall, and 0.92 for the ￿rst twenty years. The two series diverge the
most in the second half of the 1990s. This likely re￿ ects IT-related structural
changes ￿i.e. a break in trend ￿in the US economy (source of data: BEA).
Lastly, using the sample 1919-1941, we test if technology evolves exoge-














where the numbers in parenthesis are absolute t statistics. Here z0 denotes
(detrended) TFP, ￿mt stands for the change in M2, i is the three month
Treasury Bill and ￿Gt is the change in (real) government purchases. All
three additional variables were found to be statistically insigni￿cant. Uti-
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Figure 14: Capital utilization rates
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